This paper examines whether financial buyers are more likely to initiate takeovers of inefficient firms. We show that they indeed are and thus conclude that takeovers by financial buyers play a potentially beneficial role in the allocation of corporate assets in the U.S. economy. Our analysis of determinants of takeovers initiated by financial buyers uses an application of the methodology developed in Trimbath, Frydman and Frydman (2001) . In order to illustrate efficiency enhancements introduced by financial buyers, we select Forstmann and Little's acquisition of General Instrument for a brief case study. We show that their aggressive programs of cost management substantially improved the efficiency of General Instrument. Moreover, it allowed General Instrument to expand research and development to become the global leader in high definition television.
I. Introduction
Hostile takeovers came under fire in the U.S. around the end of the 1980s. What seems to have particularly galvanized public opinion are the aggressive tactics of financial investors. The active financial investors that purchased operating companies were dubbed "corporate raiders" and were also subject to congressional actions.
1
Business professionals seeking advantages through changes in corporate control were portrayed as "slick Gordon Geckos, destroyers of wealth" or worse.
2
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether financial buyers are more likely to initiate takeovers of inefficient firms. 3 We show that they indeed are and thus conclude that takeovers by financial buyers play a potentially beneficial role in the allocation of corporate assets in the U.S. economy.
Our analysis of determinants of takeovers initiated by financial buyers uses an application of the methodology developed in Trimbath, Frydman and Frydman (2001) (hereinafter referred to as TFF). As a significant improvement over the earlier approaches that have utilized probit and logit analysis, our methodology employs the Cox regression model, which is particularly appropriate for the study of a time-varying risk profile. The
Cox model is a dynamic technique that incorporates time-dependent covariates and
estimates the hazard rate of takeover at any time during the study period as a function of these covariates. 4 Using this methodology we show that the most significant determinant of a firm's risk of takeover by a financial buyer is its relatively inefficient use of resources.
5
The focus on financial buyers also allows a particularly clear look at the efficiency enhancement, if any, of their targets. Financial buyers often take the target firm public a second time. This affords us the opportunity to study an exact "before and after" picture of the target firm without the complications necessary to break out the performance of a division (when the target is merged into another operating company). In our sample, of the 38 firms taken over by financial buyers since 1981, we were able to identify 19 as having been reissued to the public.
6
Among identifiable individual financial buyers active in taking over Fortune 500 firms in our sample, Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (8) and Forstmann Little and Company (5) were the most active.
In order to illustrate efficiency enhancements introduced by financial buyers, we select Forstmann and Little's acquisition of General Instrument for a brief case study. We show that Fortsmann and Little's aggressive programs of cost management substantially improved the efficiency of General Instrument. Moreover, it allowed General Instrument to expand research and development to become the global leader in high definition television.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II we descibe the data and discuss some descriptive statistics. In Section III we describe briefly the Cox regression 4 See Section III of this paper for a brief overview of the Cox regression model. 5 These results are consistent with the results obtained in TFF for the Fortune 500 firms. 6 In fact, we were able to identify all but 4 as companies still in operation. The 15 not taken public continue to operate as private subsidiaries of the financial parents (holding companies).
model. Sections IV and V present the results and our case study. Finally, Section VI contains concluding remarks.
II. Data Description
This study, similar to TFF, is based on a sample of U.S. corporations included in the Fortune 500 ranking at least one year between 1980 and 2001. The following describes the sample and the construction of data observations applicable to our analysis.
Except for the extension into 2001, this is the same sample as used in TFF. Therefore, the reader is referred to TFF for details. We repeat here only the most relevant portions of the sample and data description.
Sample and Data Description
Takeovers -defined as a transaction in which a complete change of ownership occurs -were tracked each year from 1981 through 2000. However, cost efficiency may provide a relatively reliable measure of the prospective gain from post-takeover cost restructuring of a target.
Therefore, the adjusted cost per unit of revenue may be an important determinant of the risk of takeover and it should not be necessarily considered as just a proxy for profitability.
10
We also test net profit (net income divided by total assets). In addition to these performance measures, we used revenue (net sales) in constant dollars as a measure of the size of firms. Beyond controlling for firm size, the deflated revenue variable also provides information, complementary to the cost per unit of revenue, on the potential gains from a takeover of a relatively inefficient target. Earlier studies often interpreted the significance of the size variable in relation to capital market constraints.
11
Both of these interpretations motivate our use of the unadjusted, rather than adjusted, size variable in our hazard models.
12
9 For example Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) used the equivalent of 1 minus (cost per unit of revenue) as a proxy for profitability. 10 We suggested earlier (Trimbath, Frydman and Frydman (2000) ) that a shortfall in profitability may signal the inefficient use of resources, though such a shortfall is likely to be a relatively more uncertain measure of the potential for gain from a takeover. Net profit rate, operating profit rate, labor productivity and a proxy for Tobin's q were also investigated using this sample (with data through 1996) and methodology. None produced temporally stable results or were significant in a model that included costs. The same was true in regressions using shareholder returns and labor productivity as determinants of risk (Trimbath (2002) ). See Pugh and Jahera (1995) for more on shareholder returns. 11 See TFF for a more detailed discussion of the role of size for the risk of takeover. 12 Estimation results for hazard models using industry-adjusted size variables are very similar to the results reported here. For a detailed analysis of such models, see Trimbath (2002) . Adjusted and unadjusted size variables were highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.999).
Descriptive Statistics
We identified 38 targets as being taken over by financial buyers.
13
The category of financial buyers includes investment bankers (e.g., Merrill Lynch, Shearson Lehman, Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts) plus private investors (e.g. Rupert Murdoch, Carl Icahn).
14
In our sample over 80% of the financial buyer takeovers were completed before 1990.
15
The low number of financial buyers after 1990 makes comparisons across time problematic. For that reason, descriptive statistics are presented for the full sample period (1980-1999 observations; 1981-2000 takeovers) . Median performance measures for targets of financial buyers and all other firms are presented in Table 1 . The targets of financial buyers have significantly higher costs and lower profits than other firms. Thus, financial buyers appear to initiate takeovers of highly inefficient firms. In Section IV we will check whether this conclusion holds in the context of the multivariate Cox regression model. 13 Targets of other buyers in our sample include 186 targets of other corporate entities, 18 targets of employees and 74 targets of foreign-owned firms. 14 If employees were assisted by an investment bank, the buyer is considered to be a financial firm if the investment bank owns more than 50% of shares ex post. 15 For the argument that this is due to regulatory changes concerning financing of takeovers see TFF and Trimbath (2002) . Fields (1996) introduces a special issue of Managerial Finance on the topic of finance and the regulatory environment. Bold if significantly different from targets of financial buyers: *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05. In our sample, financial buyers are not significantly more likely to have their offer rejected (18%) nor are they more likely to change the target managers (41%) than other buyers. Therefore, this evidence does not support separate theories or regulations for "hostile raiders."
III. The Cox Regression Model
This paper employs the hazard regression model proposed by Cox (1972) The conditional hazard function of a takeover (say by a financial buyer), λ(t|X i (t)), of the i'th firm with the covariate vector X i (t), is defined by 16 The result is similar to that reported in Walsh and Kosnick (1993) .
It is seen from (1) that for small ∆t
and thus λ(t|X i (t)) is approximately the probability that a firm experiences a takeover just after time t given survival until time t and given the covariates X i (t). The Cox hazard regression model specifies the following form for the conditional hazard function
where β′ = (β 1 , …, β k ) is a vector of unknown regression coefficients, λ 0 (t) is an unknown and unspecified baseline hazard function, and β′X i (t) is an inner product.
The X i (t) may be simply the value of the firm's covariates at time t or any suitable function of the history of the firm's covariates up until time t.
An important aspect of the Cox model is that, at any point in time, the ratio of the hazard rates of takeover for two different firms does not involve the baseline hazard function. Consequently, in the case of time independent covariates, the ratio of hazard rates stays constant over time. For this reason, the Cox regression model is often referred to as the proportional hazards model. The parameter exp(β p ) represents a relative change in the hazard rate resulting from a one unit increase in the value of the p'th covariate, holding all other covariates constant, namely
The baseline hazard function, λ 0 (t), gives the hazard rate for a firm with covariates equal to 0. Since we use the cyclical consumer products sector as a baseline and we do not (1) adjust the size variable, λ 0 (t) exp(β size Size) represents the hazard rate of a takeover faced by a firm in the cyclical consumer products sector of a given size, performing at the sample medians for all other performance measures.
The parameters of the Cox regression model are λ 0 (t) and the regression coefficients β. Cox (1972) proposed the partial likelihood method for the estimation of β.
The essential feature of the estimation method proposed by Cox (1972) (so called method of partial likelihood) is that it does not involve the baseline hazard function λ 0 (t), that is, parameter β can be estimated in the absence of knowledge of λ 0 (t). The baseline hazard function is estimated subsequently in a nonparametric fashion. Since our interest is in the estimation of the relative risk of takeover faced by the firms, we focus on the estimation of β.
Takeover Data and Estimation
For takeover data, we do not observe the takeover times for all firms and, furthermore, some firms may not be observed from the beginning of the study. Thus, for the i'th firm the observed data consist of the entry time V i ≥ 0, exit time, min (T i , T ), which is either a takeover time T i , or the end of study time, T, whichever is smaller, and
ordered observed takeover times. Due to the nature of our data (yearly observations) all times are expressed in years. Let (k) be the label for a firm experiencing a takeover at T (k) , so the covariate history associated with label (k) is { X (
d k be the number of takeovers at T (k) , and let D k be the set of firms that are taken over at T (k) . Also let R k be the set of firms at risk of a takeover just before time T (k) , that is, R k = {j : V j < T (k) ≤ T j }. The regression coefficients, β, are estimated by the value of β which maximizes the (approximate) partial likelihood: The partial likelihood function is formed as the product over all takeover times.
The k'th factor in this product is in turn a product of d k conditional probabilities; each representing the probability that a given firm in set D k is taken over at T (k) given that the firms in R k are at risk of a takeover.
Since in this study we focus on the characteristics of targets taken over by financial buyers, for our purposes a takeover event occurs only when a takeover is by a financial buyer. Thus, in our application T (1) < T (2) < ... < T (L) are the observed takeover times of takeovers by financial buyers only. The observations on the firms which undergo other types of takeovers are treated as right censored at the times of their takeovers.
These firms, similar to non-targets, are in the appropriate risk sets in the partial likelihood function and are assumed to exit the sample at their respective takeover times. Thus, for the purpose of the estimation of the regression coefficients in the hazard function of a takeover by a financial buyer, the targets of other than financial buyers are treated similarly to non-targets.
In our application the Cox regression model is implemented using STATA (StataCorp. (2001)).
IV. Results
The results of our estimation of the Cox regression models including the size and cost variables are presented in Table 2 . Size is not significant, suggesting that financial buyers have not faced systematic financing impediments in their takeover transactions. It should be noted that prior studies of takeovers have suggested and often found that size has a negative effect on the risk of takeover and this negative effect of size on risk has been attributed to the difficulties in financing larger takeover transactions (for example, see Singh (1975) and Hasbrouck (1985) ).
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Firms in the Industrial Sector faced a significantly higher risk of takeover from financial firms unless cost inefficiency is included in the model. 18 Thus, this sectoral effect seems to capture the greater cost inefficiency of targets of financial buyers in that sector. This accords well with the general belief that industrial restructuring was taking place across inefficient industrial firms to make them more competitive. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Cyclical Consumer Products is the excluded sector. All regressions use 846 firms and 38 takeovers. Cox proportional hazard models estimated with robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) . Coefficients are the change in the log-odds per unit.
The results presented in Table 2 show that cost inefficiency appears to be an important determinant of the risk of takeover. To check the robustness of this result and facilitate comparison with earlier takeover studies using measures of profitability, Table 3 reports estimation results for the models including cost and net profit variables.
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that once the cost variable is included in the model, the net profit variable looses significance.
19
Although the profitability measure is significant in a model excluding the cost variable, this model has significantly lower explanatory power. This can be readily seen by comparing the value of the chi-squared statistics in models with and without costs.
19 In TFF we show that this result holds for operating profit and other performance measures in a model of determinants of Fortune 500 targets that ignores the buyer type. (Lin and Wei, 1989) . Coefficients are the change in the log-odds per unit.
V. CASE STUDY: General Instrument Corporation
Before the takeover, General Instrument Corporation was known as a "middling- Rumsfeld chairman and chief executive officer of GI.
Efficiency Enhancements
Rumsfeld was no stranger to corporate turnarounds. After serving as defense secretary and chief of staff to President Gerald Ford, Rumsfeld helped turn around G.D.
Searle & Co. before its purchase by Monsanto Co. His strategy for GI was to concentrate on the basic business, sell off assets "that don't fit," cut costs and reduce debt. Eventually, GI shed businesses with annual sales of nearly $400 million (Table 4) .
Revenues fell an additional 14% in the first ex post year as cable TV companies cut back capital spending during the early 1990s credit crunch.
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That jeopardized the cash flow GI needed to meet loan covenants with its banks. Rumsfeld cut $65 million in annual overhead, mostly by shedding staff and management layers. GI cut inventories; to cut inefficiency, it instituted crash quality-control programs in its factories.
22
In addition to meeting financial goals, the cost reduction allowed GI to increase R&D spending by a 20 In fact, FL's $285 million purchase of Department 56, Inc. in 1992, made without any bank financing, is reported to have been the first self-financed transaction in the history of leveraged buyouts. 21 The Federal Reserve Board designated the borrowings of cable companies as "highly leveraged transactions." The clamp down on bank lending in high-debt situations, and its impact on the supply of capital equipment funding, produced the toughest credit crunch the cable industry had ever experienced. ("Deal of the decade," Jacqueline S. Gold, Financial World, Sept 1, 1992, p26(4).) 22 "How a high-tech bet paid off big," Thomas A. Stewart, Fortune, Nov 1, 1993, p. 101(2) . Cost per unit of revenue is the ratio of cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses to sales. Sales, Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, General and Administrative Expenses in $millions. Profit is net income as a percent of assets.
Despite their vilification in the 1980s, we show that the active financial investors that purchased operating companies were more likely to initiate takeovers of inefficient firms. We thus conclude that takeovers by financial buyers play a potentially beneficial role in the allocation of corporate assets in the U.S. economy.
